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History Aplenty – but still too isolated 
 
 
Like most political anniversaries, the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of 
Rome, marked by multiple events in the spring of 2007, has rapidly faded from memory.  
In its brief moment of prominence, however, the occasion did serve to underline quite 
how long the European integration process has lasted.  The EC/EU itself is more than 
fifty years old; some form of institutionalised level of cooperation at a European level has 
been in existence now for over six decades; and the idea of European unity and 
cooperation has a much longer history even than that.  There is hence plenty for 
historians of European integration to get their teeth into, even making allowances for the 
normal reluctance of historians to study subjects which are too close to the present and 
for which access to archival documents is limited.  A varied and wide ranging 
historiography has been the result.  The first part of this chapter will briefly review what 
has been written by historians about the integration process; the second part will then 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of this work; and a third part will suggest a number 
of fields to which historians appear to be (or in some cases, ought to be) turning their 
attention.  
 
From ideas to states and institutions and back again? 
The first focus of European integration history was the Second World War, or more 
precisely, the Europeanist ideas which emerged amongst resistance groups and 
governments-in-exile during the 1940-5 period.  The work of Walter Lipgens, in 
particular, identified those engaged in a battle against Nazism as the pioneers in that 
change of European attitudes towards nations and nationalism which would make 
possible postwar cooperation and integration.  Nazism and Fascism had discredited 
nationalism; still more importantly, the experience of military defeat and/or occupation 
undergone by all European states except Britain and a handful of neutrals, demonstrated 
the inability of individual nation states, acting alone, to fulfil their most basic obligation 
of protecting their citizens.  As a result, war-time opponents of Nazism came to a shared 
realisation that the international architecture of the postwar world could not be built upon 
fully sovereign nation states alone.  This readiness to transcend the nation state was a 
vital precondition for the success of postwar integration (Lipgens and Loth, 1977, 
Lipgens and Loth, 1988, Lipgens and Loth, 1991). 
 This thesis fitted well with the multiple memoirs of protagonists in the early 
integration process which had been published in the 1960s and early 1970s.  (Hallstein, 
1972, Monnet, 1978, Pineau and Rimbaud, 1991, Spaak, 1969, Adenauer, 1965, 
Adenauer, 1966, Adenauer, 1967, Adenauer, 1968)  These too tended to present the 
European integration experiment as an attempt to break away from the nationalistic 
rivalries which had twice led Europe into war in the Twentieth Century.  It also fitted 
well with the rhetoric of the European institutions which again liked to present 
themselves as being fundamentally about peace rather than merely economics.  And it 
seemed to have the additional merit of explaining Britain’s ambivalence towards 
European integration.  The UK, it was argued, had not suffered defeat and occupation 
during the Second World War and had hence come out of the conflict with faith in its 
own institutions and in its own ability to steer an independent course in the world 
reinforced rather than weakened.  Britain had thus looked askance at the ambitious 
supranational schemes espoused by its continental neighbours and rejected invitations to 
participate.   This failure to join either the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
or the European Economic Community (EEC) from the outset – a choice later British 
governments appeared to regret - was, in Monnet’s telling phrase, ‘the price of victory’ 
(Charlton, 1983). 
 Unfortunately, though, the identification of World War II resistance leaders as the 
originators of a major break with Europe’s nationalist path did little actually to explain 
how the integration process began.  The first effective move towards supranational 
integration had after all only been accomplished with the Schuman Plan in 1950, by 
which time the majority of those politicians who had emerged into prominence through 
their role in the wartime resistance movements had either lapsed back into obscurity or 
had been compelled to reinvent themselves in a decidedly more nationalistic mode so as 
to survive in the rough and tumble of peacetime politics.  Neither chronology nor 
continuity of personnel thus suggested a strong link between wartime ideas and the actual 
decisions which led to the ECSC or the EEC.  Explaining the breakthroughs of 1950 or 
1955 would need another type of explanation. 
 In the event, two rival schools emerged, one emphasizing the political motivations 
which underlay the establishment of the ECSC and the EEC, the other highlighting an 
economic chain of causality.  The former was most closely associated with the two so-
called Power in Europe volumes, which gathered contributions from an impressive array 
of the most prominent international historians at work in France, Germany, Italy and the 
UK (Becker and Knipping, 1986, Di Nolfo, 1992).  These presented the key integration 
choices (or non-choices in the British case) of the four main Western European states as 
being a result of their altered power status within postwar international relations.  The 
Treaty of Rome was thus, as Pierre Guillen put it, ‘a cure for French impotence’.  In 
similar fashion integration represented an opportunity for Germany and Italy to regain 
some of the status and international respectability forfeited by wartime defeat and, for the 
Federal Republic of Germany, a means to bind itself securely to the West in such a 
fashion that neither its allies nor subsequent German governments could cast doubt on its 
Western alignment (Küsters, 1982).   For exponents of the second school by contrast, led 
by the economic historian Alan Milward, these same choices could be explained 
primarily in economic terms.  The Schuman Plan thus constituted a French scheme 
designed to prevent its postwar economic recovery plan (masterminded by none other 
than Jean Monnet) from being thrown off course by the re-emergence of West Germany 
as a major steel producer (Milward, 1984). The EEC meanwhile began life as a Dutch 
device, intended to make irreversible the degree of  trade liberalisation within Western 
Europe which had already occurred by the early 1950s and upon which small, advanced 
economies like that of the Netherlands had come to rely (Milward et al., 1992).  The 
success of this Dutch idea was greatly facilitated, however, when it was seized upon by a 
small côterie of French leaders as a mechanism which could wean France off its 
traditional protectionism by offering the opportunity of controlled liberalisation within a 
small and potentially tightly regulated common market (Lynch, 1997). 
 Despite their very obvious differences, however, both schools shared two 
important assumptions.  The first was that the key actors in the integration story were 
states and not the loose collection of Europeanist thinkers who had populated the pages of 
Lipgens’ account.  It was through the actions of the governments of France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Britain that the emergence of the ECSC and the EEC could 
best be explained.  Second, both the contributors to the Power in Europe volumes and 
Milward and his entourage, de-emphasised the role of Europeanist idealism and instead 
stressed the vital importance of hard-headed calculation.  Those national bureaucrats and 
politicians who made the key choices which initiated the integration process were not 
motivated by a desire to transcend the nation-state and nationalism, but instead to further 
national needs and ambitions (either economic or political) through a strategy based on 
far-reaching cooperation and the pooling of sovereignty.  Milward’s striking title, The 
European Rescue of the Nation-State could in essence apply to either school. 
 This was an important breakthrough.  Both the writings of Lipgens and the early 
memoir accounts had suggested a level of altruism and idealism in the early decisions 
about European integration which sat uncomfortably with the normal behaviour of 
national politicians.  The new explanations by contrast, whether emphasising economic 
or political factors, were much more akin to the type of arguments that historians have 
employed to explain other international phenomena like the outbreak of the two World 
Wars, the decolonisation process, or the breakdown of East-West relations.  The 
emphasis on state actions, furthermore, indicated that historians of the integration process 
could make use of the well-trodden research paths leading to the national archives of each 
of the states involved.  A huge outpouring of literature ensued, much of it probing the 
actions and motivations of individual national governments or even of individual 
ministries or ministers within these governments. 
 A significant amount of this research took the form of contributions to edited 
volumes.  The conference volume seemed a particularly appropriate vehicle in the field of 
European integration history, able to bring together studies of how each country took the 
decision for or against involvement in the nascent European institutions.  Collaborative 
works of this sort also meant that a new field could make the most of the pre-existing 
reservoir of expertise on national political histories.  The usual pattern of work was hence 
for the contributions on French policy to be written by well-established French historians, 
those on Germany to be penned by German specialists and those on the UK to be the 
work of leading British historians.  The key series of volumes taking this approach re-
examined wartime cooperation, the Schuman Plan, the failed European Defence 
Community project,  and the chain of events leading from the Messina conference of 
1955 to the signature of the Rome Treaties themselves in 1957 (Poidevin, 1986a, 
Schwabe, 1988, Serra, 1989, Trausch, 1993).  Another more thematically organised 
collection investigated the theme of European identity – although again with a lot of 
emphasis on national calculation and governmental action (Bossuat and Girault, 1994, 
Deighton, 1995, Fleury and Frank, 1997, Girault, 1994, Girault and Bossuat, 1993, Bitsch 
et al., 1998) 
 The tendency of European integration history writing to be organised around 
national studies was also visible in the first wave of monographs on the subject.  One 
striking example was Gérard Bossuat’s heavyweight study of France, the Marshall Plan 
and European integration (Bossuat, 1997).  Others to follow a similar approach included 
Laschi’s work on Italian agriculture and Europe, Rhenisch’s investigation of German 
business and early European integration, and Hitchcock’s account of early postwar 
French policy (Hitchcock, 1998, Rhenisch, 1999, Laschi, 2000).  Thiemeyer, Noël and 
Weilemann did constitute valuable exceptions to this rule with their multinational focus 
on individual policy areas, but were not enough seriously to undermine the trend (Noël, 
1988, Thiemeyer, 1999, Weilemann, 1983).  Nor was this concentration on the policy of 
individual states confined to books about the six states which did participate in the first 
European institutions.  On the contrary, a sizeable literature emerged both on the policies 
of the most prominent sceptic towards European integration – the United Kingdom – and 
on the actions of European unity’s greatest external cheerleader, the United States.  The 
former ranged from John Young’s investigation of British policy towards European 
integration under the first postwar Labour government, via two detailed assessments of 
why Britain chose not to accept the Schuman Plan, to James Ellison’s analysis of the free 
trade area scheme with which London had hoped to temper the harmful effects of its self-
willed exclusion from the EEC (Dell, 1995, Ellison, 2000, Lord, 1996, Young, 1984). 
Mention also should be made of the three detailed monographs written on British policy 
towards the European Defence Community project and the question of German 
rearmament (Dockrill, 1991, Mawby, 1999, Ruane, 2000).   The most thorough 
investigation of Washington’s supportive role was probably that by Pascaline Winand 
(Winand, 1993).  But there were also useful studies by Lundestad, Killick, Giauque and 
Skogmar, as well as highly relevant sections in the biographical studies of McCloy, 
Dulles and Conant (Giauque, 2002, Hershberg, 1993, Immerman, 1990, Killick, 1997, 
Lundestad, 1998, Schwartz, 1991, Skogmar, 2004). All of these confirmed the degree of 
activism shown by US policy makers in encouraging Europe to unite. 
 The biographical approach was also effectively used on some of the European 
figures who had played leading roles in the early history of integration.  Possibly the first 
major contribution in this respect was Raymond Poidevin’s reconstruction of Robert 
Schuman’s political life (Poidevin, 1986b).  But this has been followed by equally 
accomplished studies of Adenuaer, of De Gasperi, of Bidault, of Van Zeeland, of Spaak, 
of Eden, of Macmillan, of de Gaulle, of Pompidou and of Monnet himself (Duchêne and 
Monnet, 1994, Dujardin and Dumoulin, 1997, Dumoulin, 1999, Dutton, 1997, Horne, 
1989, Lacouture, 1991, Roussel, 1994, Roussel, 1996, Roussel, 2002, Schwarz, 1986, 
Schwarz, 1991, Craveri, 2006, Bézias, 2006).  Most of these sought to contextualise each 
politician’s European decisions within the wider framework of their approach to foreign 
policy, thereby reinforcing the trend away from an emphasis on Europeanist ideology and 
towards integration as a means of advancing national interest.  Schuman’s decision-
making in the run-up to the European plan that would bear his name, was not thus 
intrinsically different from that which led to his decisions in the fields of East-West 
relations or of France’s bilateral relations with the United States (Poidevin, 1986b).   
Likewise the most recent and thorough study of De Gasperi rejects the portrayal of the 
Italian statesman by earlier biographers as a convinced federalist, and suggests instead 
that his enthusiasm for Italian involvement in the integration process was a much more 
complex and multi-causal affair (Craveri, 2006).  
 The fact that all of this literature was based primarily on archival materials from 
national collections also influenced the chronological focus of the research.  Western 
governments tend to operate what is known as a ‘thirty year rule’ – a system under which 
previously secret government materials are made available to historians three decades 
after they were written.  This means that the frontier of historical scholarship usually lies 
a little over thirty years before the present (allowing for the time needed to process and 
write up the archival findings).  Thus the 1990s saw the beginning of substantial work on 
the operation and initial development of the European Community in the 1960s.  One 
focus for attention was the way in which the EEC’s early success obliged those European 
countries which had originally chosen not to take part to reconsider their position.  A 
succession of volumes thus investigated the Community’s first encounters with the issue 
of enlargement in 1961-3 and again in 1967 (Griffiths and Ward, 1996, Kaiser, 1996, 
Milward, 2002, Parr, 2006, Pine, 2007, Schaad, 2000, Tratt, 1996, Wilkes, 1997, 
Daddow, 2002, Ludlow, 1997).  The British case naturally loomed large in most of these 
books – decisions taken in London were after all the trigger for all three rounds of 
enlargement discussions in the 1961-1973 period - but many of the edited volumes also 
contained work looking at the manner in which the Danes, Irish and Norwegians applied 
alongside the British, as well as the positions adopted by countries like Sweden or Spain.  
Some of these titles also analysed the enlargement episode from the Community’s point 
of view, demonstrating that while the terms ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ only entered 
general usage after the Hague Summit of December 1969, the perceived tension between 
these two ambitions dated back to 1961 at least.   Work on the actual first enlargement, 
by contrast, has been somewhat slow to emerge.  The general overview by Kaiser and 
Elvert  of how the Community’s membership has grown did offer some discussion of the 
1970-2 negotiations, as did the special issue of the Journal of European Integration 
History dedicated to enlargement (Kaiser and Elvert, 2004) (JEIH 11/2 (2005)).  A 
further special issue of the same journal also provided valuable analysis of the Hague 
Summit which arguably cleared the way for EC expansion (JEIH 9/1 (2003)).  Previously 
unknown details of the Heath-Pompidou discussions at the May 1971 summit were 
revealed in Roussel’s biography of the French President (Roussel, 1994).  And the 
official British history of the negotiations written up by Sir Con O’Neill was made public 
by Frank Cass (O'Neill, 2000).  But none of the detailed doctorates devoted to the 
membership negotiations of the early 1970s which are underway or have recently been 
completed have yet been published. 
 Books on the Community’s internal development also gradually proliferated.  The 
best starting point for someone wanting to master this literature are the three edited 
volumes which resulted from conferences organised by the EU Liaison Committee of 
Historians (Loth, 2001, Milward and Deighton, 1999, Varsori, 2006). These 
demonstrated the way in which a focus on the post-1958 period obliged authors to flank 
the traditional studies centring on individual member states (which naturally continued) 
with new research on both the Community institutions and the gradual emergence of 
common policies.  Such institutional investigations followed a trail which had been 
successfully blazed by the well-produced official history of the High Authority of the 
ECSC (Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1993).  It was followed by a series of other volumes 
exploring the early growth of the EC’s institutional system (Bitsch et al., 1998, Heyen, 
1992, Kaiser et al., 2009, Loth, 2005, Varsori, 2006).  2007 also saw the emergence of a 
second official history this time focusing on the European Commission between 1958 and 
1972 (Dumoulin and Bitsch, 2007).  This contained some genuinely useful new material, 
but did highlight the dangers of the Commission’s decision not to accompany the writing 
of an official history with the type of systematic attempt to catalogue and organise its 
archives in the manner which had so strengthened the Poidevin and Spierenburg volume.  
Few of the historians involved in the new project appear to have found the oral 
testimonies of ageing former fonctionnaires a fully adequate replacement for the multiple 
gaps in the Commission’s archival record.  
 Book length studies of the Community’s policies have been slow to appear: the 
first monograph devoted to a common policy looks likely to be an in-depth investigation 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (Knudsen, 2009), but the succession of recent 
doctorates devoted to other Community policies, from the common commercial policy 
and the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations, to competition policy, suggest the 
beginnings of an overdue and highly welcome trend.  There had been several chapters 
and articles devoted to common policies (Kaiser et al., 2009, Ludlow, 2005, Varsori, 
2006).  Ludlow meanwhile made a first attempt to combine national, institutional and 
policy-oriented approaches so as to produce a comprehensive overview of the 
Community’s evolution in the second half of the 1960s (Ludlow, 2006). 
 National studies have continued of course.  Good examples include Henning 
Turk’s investigation of the European policies of the Grand Coalition government in 
Germany between 1966 and 1969 and Antonio Varsori’s multiple collections, both of 
individual chapters on different aspects of policy-making in Rome and of core documents 
relating to Italy’s European policy (Ballini and Varsori, 2004, Türk, 2006, Varsori and 
Romero, 2006).  Gehler’s work on Austria or Crespo MacLennan’s on Spain also 
demonstrates that the path towards involvement with the EC of those states who had 
initially not been members remains a subject of ongoing investigation (Gehler, 2005, 
MacLennan, 2000).  National chapters have gone on being a feature, moreover, of the 
first few edited volumes devoted to European integration in the 1970s (Knipping and 
Schönwald, 2004, Van der Harst, 2007).  A healthy sub-genre of bilateral studies has also 
emerged, exploring the development of European cooperation through a focus on the 
relations between key European states.  Predictably perhaps the relationship between 
France and Germany has been the most extensively investigated (Bitsch and Mestre, 
2001, Lappenküper, 2001, Soutou, 1996), but there have also been detailed investigations 
of relations between Italy and France, Italy and Germany, Britain and Germany, Britain 
and France, Britain and the Netherlands, and Germany and the Netherlands (Bagnato, 
1995, Decup, 1998, Schaad, 2000, Wielenga, 1997, Ashton and Hellema, 2001, Masala, 
1997).  
 The last few years has also seen a significant re-emergence of interest in the ideas 
that underpinned European integration and the political movements within which they 
flourished.   Christian Democracy, the political tradition out of which emerged the 
majority of those dubbed the ‘founding fathers’ is understandably the political tradition 
focused upon most (Gehler and Kaiser, 2004, Kaiser, 2007, Risso, 2007).  But there has 
also been work both on the Socialists and Europe (Anaya, 2002) and upon those who 
rejected Europe.  Robert Dewey’s forthcoming study on British Euroscepticism in the 
1960s will be of great significance in this respect (Dewey, 2009), but interesting work is 
also being done on the opposition of the Italian Communists to their country’s 
participation in the building of Europe.  Over two decades on from the decisive rejection 
by historians of Walter Lipgens’ earlier emphasis on ideas and idealism as the main 
motivating forces behind European integration, a new generation of specialists seems to 
be rediscovering that neither national nor institutional motivations alone are sufficient to 
explain the transformation of Europe since 1950.  Instead the ideas, beliefs, fears and 
political milieux of those politicians and officials who took the crucial decisions is once 
again coming under deserved historical scrutiny. 
 
Broad but too uncritical and isolated? 
The key strength of this historiography has been its breadth and variety.   The topics 
covered range from the precise economic incentives of prominent European industrialists 
(Dumoulin, 1993), to the world view of military thinkers, passing en route the 
motivations of civil servants, politicians and intellectuals, and the anxieties and 
aspirations of those who chose to promote the process and those who chose to contest it.  
Geographically there has also been an encouraging diversity, both in terms of the 
countries written about and the national provenance of those doing the historical research.  
Only the countries which used to lie behind the Iron Curtain have been largely untouched 
by the spread of interest in European integration history – an understandable situation 
given that points of intersection between the national development of these countries and 
the integration process were few and far between prior to 1989.  In the last five to ten 
years, there has also been a welcome loosening of the assumption that only scholars from 
a given country can study in depth the European policies of that country.  A healthy 
number of the younger specialists are thus working on nations other than their own, not to 
mention those other researchers who have focused on institutions, policies or political 
parties instead of national governments.  The days of the conference paper on France 
being reserved for the senior French historian present, or the young English researcher 
being automatically expected to do the ‘Britain and x’ chapter in a volume would appear 
to be numbered. 
 Also welcome has been the relatively high degree of institutionalisation which the 
field has undergone.  This matters greatly in a subject area where so many depend upon 
receiving information about and assistance in using archival resources elsewhere in 
Europe.  Similarly, the existence of established networks helps the flow of information 
about key new publications in the field and dissemination of information about 
conferences, work-shops or collaborative projects.  The oldest of these networks is what 
is now called the EU Liaison Committee of Historians, which began life over twenty five 
years ago as a Commission funded initiative.  Direct EC funding has long since dried up, 
but the group continues to meet regularly, to organise periodic conferences designed to 
showcase the latest research, and to publish the Journal of European Integration History.  
Another, larger and slightly looser network, with a membership which overlaps 
substantially with that of the Liaison Committee, is the product of the large transnational 
project, originally set up by René Girault to explore European identity, and now directed 
by Robert Frank in its investigation of ‘Les Espaces Européennes’.   Professor Frank has 
also just put in place a further collaborative network linking specialists in the field across 
Europe for a project which will study the ‘Dimensions and dynamics of European 
Integration’. 
 Alongside these networks of well-established specialists, there are also two highly 
active networks of younger researchers, both of which have emerged in the course of the 
last five years.  One, originally based in Paris, but now with members across Europe and 
beyond is called RICHIE (Reseau International de Chercheurs de l’Histoire d’Intégration 
Européenne); the other, which emerged in Britain but has also spread substantially, is 
called HEIRS (History of European Integration Research Society). Both organise regular 
conferences and share an email circulation list which has become vital for spreading 
information about publications and events.  This matters all the more in a field where 
researchers are widely spread geographically and often lack fellow specialists in their 
own universities.  And like the existence of a specialist journal and the more senior 
networks, both RICHIE and HEIRS serve an important role in insulating emerging 
scholars against the current unfashionability of international and especially international 
political history within the wider historical profession.  The numbers involved in each 
network and the geographic and methodological variety of their output also suggests a 
degree of intellectual vitality which is highly encouraging. 
 Writing the history of the integration process is not without its difficulties or 
controversies, however.  As Mark Gilbert pointed out in a thoughtful recent piece in the 
Journal of Common Market Studies, writing about the EC can all too easily drift into 
patterns associated with Whig History – i.e. narrating the establishment of the 
Communities and then Union as if part of some progressive and possibly teleological tale 
the positive outcome and import of which is beyond doubt (Gilbert, 2008).  This can 
involve the careless use of emotive language about ‘advance’, ‘relaunch’, and 
‘stagnation’ all of which imply unquestioningly that the progress of integration is a good 
thing and its slowing or even reversal an unwelcome development.  It can also over-
emphasise the personal role of the founding fathers, and of Monnet in particular, in a 
fashion which most branches of history rejected decades ago as outdated and 
hagiographic.   And it can lead to a portrayal of those, like de Gaulle or Thatcher, who 
have harboured serious misgivings about the integration process, as blinkered 
reactionaries, standing in the way of enlightened advance. 
 Another set of potential difficulties are related to the way in which historical 
attention has for the most part focused on the making of institutions and policies and not 
upon their wider impact.  This means that the main documentary sources have been the 
records of those governments and institutions that devised and pushed for further 
integration – i.e. precisely those who are likely to have regarded this ‘advance’ in the 
most positive light – whereas the views of those who may have been affected by the 
integration process, but who had no role in its genesis, have seldom been taken into 
account.  Inevitably some of language and to a lesser extent some of the judgements 
reflecting this lopsided source base find their way into historians’ accounts.  Similarly 
judgements about the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of an institution or policy have tended to be 
grounded upon the institution’s or policy’s repercussions within the integration process – 
on whether, for instance, it strengthened or weakened French governmental support for 
further integration, or helped create the momentum for some subsequent institutional 
‘advance’ – rather than being based upon the repercussions of the institution or policy on 
the citizens of Europe or of the world beyond.  This point was well illustrated at a recent 
historical conference on the origins and development of the common agricultural policy 
(CAP), where the papers emphasising the ‘success’ of the policy in the 1960s and 1970s 
as measured by its effect in galvanising the integration process, stood in stark contrast to 
other contributions which assessed the farm policy’s overall commercial impact or, still 
more strikingly, the deleterious effects which European agricultural protectionism had on 
the groundnut producers of Senegal.  Needless to say the judgements and choice of 
language in the latter papers, were much more negative about this aspect of European 
integration, than papers in the first category had been. 
 Equally serious, to my mind, is the highly fragmented nature of most detailed 
work on European integration history.  As is the case with a lot of contemporary history 
writing, those analysing the Community/Union’s past have often preferred to write 
densely footnoted and impeccably researched micro-studies of small and isolated 
episodes in integration history rather than seeking to explain the broader pattern of 
development.  Such studies are in part a function of the sheer volume of archival material 
that any one Twentieth Century national government, let alone multiple governments plus 
assorted Community institutions, produce in any given month or year.  With so 
mountainous a pile of paper to analyse it is perhaps not surprising that most sensible 
historians choose to master a small portion, rather than generalise on the basis of much 
less in-depth research.  This choice may also reflect the current unfashionability amongst 
historians of anything which might be denounced by postmodernist critics as a ‘meta-
narrative’.  And at an even more prosaic level, the tendency to produce small miniatures 
rather than vast frescos may partly reflect a university culture which, all over Europe, 
becomes ever more obsessed with the regular production of detailed research articles and 
books, rather than tolerating the type of long gestation which a truly commanding 
overview of the integration process between 1947 and 1990 for example would require.   
An academic Michelangelo of the late 20th or early 21st century, might well find 
themselves obliged to churn out small scale portraits, rather than aspiring to paint the 
Sistine Chapel ceiling! 
 The overall effect, however, is to produce a very patchy tableau of integration 
history, with some areas filled in with huge levels of detail, but other equally large 
portions lacking any real paint at all.  The missing interconnections between the various 
points where details have been painted in and the vast areas where only the barest outline 
of events has been sketched out,  rob the overall picture of any easily discernable shape 
or structure.  As a result, the existing historical literature often fails to offer fully 
convincing answers to the questions that historians specialising in other fields or 
European specialists from other intellectual disciplines might be most expected to ask, 
such as ‘did this all matter?’, ‘has integration changed Europe, for better or worse, in the 
way that its proponents (and opponents) have claimed?’, or even ‘why has a process 
begun over five decades ago been able to sustain itself, let alone expanding in both 
geographical scope and the range of policy areas involved?’  Instead integration 
historians have been somewhat prone to expend most of their energies in detailed 
discussions of why exactly the Community evolved as it did over a brief five year period, 
without being able to communicate effectively why such minutiae matter. 
 The end result has been an unacceptable degree of isolation from both the 
discussions of other historians and the debates of European specialists looking at the 
EC/EU from within political science, international relations, economics, or law.  As far as 
other historians are concerned, the problem is evident both from the missing integration 
dimension of many discussions of 20th century European history and from the tendency 
of integration historians to produce works which fail, and often barely even try, to link 
the integration story with the wider evolution of Europe in the post-1945 period.  The 
first of these difficulties becomes apparent from even a brief look at recent survey texts.  
Some confine their discussion of the integration process entirely to its economic effects – 
and even at this level regard it as a secondary factor (James, 2003).  Others, like Tony 
Judt’s Postwar pay greater lip service to the idea that integration has somehow 
transformed Europe, but seem unable to provide much indication of how this 
transformation might actually have been wrought (Judt, 2007).  In-depth discussion of 
how the progressive institutionalisation of interaction between European countries might 
have altered the manner in which they related to one another – not merely making intra-
European conflict less likely, if not impossible, but fundamentally blurring the dividing 
line between domestic and foreign policy – is largely absent, as is any real debate about 
how the growth of a European level of governance may or may not have affected national 
politics.  Nor are integration historians much better at making linkages between their own 
specialist concerns and the wider sweep of European history.   Americanization, the cold 
war, the decolonization process, or the development across Western Europe of a highly 
distinctive pattern of welfare states all play a much less prominent role in many accounts 
of the EC’s development than might be expected.   
 A similar lack of dialogue characterises the relationship between integration 
historians and their peers in other academic fields.   A few brave political scientists have 
sought to engage with the Community’s historical development and begin a conversation 
with those who work primarily on its past – Andrew Moravcsik and Craig Parsons would 
be the most obvious examples – although their results have sometimes been as eloquent 
about the mutual frustrations involved in such exchanges as about their potential 
(Moravcsik, 1998, Parsons, 2003).  And a minority of integration historians have 
responded in kind, seeking to deploy a limited number of concepts and ideas borrowed 
from those who work on the contemporary EU, to an analysis of its development over 
time (Kaiser et al., 2009).  But such exceptions barely dent a generalised rule of non-
communication.  The ‘background’ chapters of many a political science text book on the 
EU thus remain a frightening redoubt of myths about the institutions’ past which most 
historians discredited years ago; the writings of those who dub themselves ‘historical 
institutionalists’ contain next to nothing that a historian would recognise as relating to his 
or her own work.  Meanwhile much of the output of historians remains wide open to the 
charge of being conceptually underdeveloped and based on scant working knowledge of 
how the EU is viewed as functioning today.   
 The situation is even worse, furthermore, when it comes to engagement with the 
fields of law and economics.  The former is particularly striking given the centrality of 
law to the whole integration process and the way in which academic specialists on 
European law were among the first university experts to begin serious study of what was 
happening in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Brussels.  Yet in the main historians neither 
read lawyers – past or present – nor lawyers read historians.  The development of the 
European Court of Justice thus remains largely uncharted; the allusions to the landmarks 
of European jurisprudence are brief and sparing in most history texts; and the legal 
literature itself seems deeply uninterested in the way that the emergence of European law 
interacted with the parallel development of the Community/Union, still less the evolving 
Western European political and social context.  Nor has the prominence of a number of 
economic historians in the historiography of European integration led to a much better 
situation with regard to interchange with economics.  Milward’s writings for instance 
show a distinct preference to engage with economic theorising dating back to the 1950s 
and 1960s, rather than tangling with any economic debate of more recent vintage.  His 
Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union refers to Viner, Meade, 
Lipsey and Sciatovsky – all of whom were writing when the integration process had 
barely begun - but contains only two footnotes which mention an economic text 
published since 1980 (Milward, 2005).  Needless to say, such disdain is returned in more 
than equal measure by most economists who continue to write about the economics of 
European integration in a fashion which suggests hardly any interest in, or knowledge of, 
anything which occurred before 1985.   
 So where now? 
The easiest future trend of European integration historiography to predict is the gradual 
advance of that chronological barrier represented by the thirty year rule.  The focus of 
much research has already shifted from the 1960s to the 1970s, and it is almost certain 
that over the next decade increasing forays will be made by historians forward into the 
largely unexplored territory of the 1980s.  For integration specialists this means that a 
variety of new topics are likely to become the subject of enquiry.  These range from the 
consequences of enlargement (both the first and the second), to the broadening of the 
EC’s policy agenda in the 1970s and 1980s.  Also predictable – indeed already underway 
to some extent – is a more general reconsideration of the 1970s, which are all too often 
still labelled as a stagnant decade, despite the series of vital institutional, policy, and legal 
changes that occurred.  And also likely in the medium term is growing interest not merely 
in the historical roots of the 1980s relance, but also in the extent to which the 
Community/Union affected and was affected by the geopolitical transformation of the 
European continent in 1989-90.   Hopefully this last will oblige integration historians to 
engage with the historiography of the cold war – and force cold war historians to 
acknowledge the importance of European integration – to a degree which has not 
occurred so far. 
 There is also some chance that the rigid adherence to the thirty year rule will 
begin to fade.  This reflects the way in which several European countries and the 
Community institutions themselves have begun to alter their legislation on the release of 
confidential government documents.  Both Britain and the EU institutions have thus 
adopted freedom of information legislation which ought to make possible targeted 
requests for the early release of documents; France has shifted from a thirty year rule to a 
twenty five year rule and also allows outgoing Presidents or their heirs to set independent 
rules for access to Elysée papers.  Frustratingly this means that most of the papers of 
General de Gaulle are still locked up, but those of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and François 
Mitterrand have already been profitably raided by some historians.  The Netherlands has 
long operated a twenty year rule.  The United States, moreover, which has often been the 
EC/EU’s key interlocutor, also releases many documents well before three decades have 
elapsed.  A resourceful researcher thus might well be able to range well into the 1980s 
and possibly beyond substantially earlier than would traditionally have been the case 
under the thirty year rule. 
 This ability to overcome the usual chronological restrictions on European 
integration history might become even more pronounced were historians to jettison some 
of their customary hesitations about the use of oral history.  At present oral history within 
a Community context has tended to be restricted to interviewing eye-witnesses about 
events well over three decades old.  Inevitably this has placed clear limits upon the 
reliability of such evidence – memories are seldom entirely accurate after such a long 
interval – as well as severely restricting the number of potential interviewees.  But Pierre 
Gerbet demonstrated over fifty years ago, and Peter Ludlow has confirmed, both with his 
work on the making of the European Monetary System written in the late 1970s and early 
1980s and with his much more recent writings on European Council meetings over the 
last five years, valuable results can be obtained by marrying the approach of a historian 
with off-the-record interviewing of protagonists more usually employed by journalists or 
political scientists (Gerbet, 1956, Ludlow, 1982, Ludlow, 2004).  Such work could also 
benefit from the multiple EU related documents that are already within the public 
domain, and the many more which are likely to be shown unofficially to a determined but 
tactful investigator.  A historian willing to break with convention and focus their attention 
on a much more recent period of EU history might therefore reap substantial rewards.  
This is all the more true given the widespread doubts that exist about the extent to which 
good archiving practices persist in national and Community civil services which now 
work primarily by email, telephone and informal face-to-face meetings.  The treasure 
trove of official papers relating to the 1980s and beyond may, in other words, prove less 
valuable when it finally does emerge, than has been the case for the first three quarters of 
the twentieth century. 
 Another welcome change would be an increased level of investigation into the 
impact of integration.  To a certain extent this is almost bound to happen as the 
chronological centre of gravity of historical research rolls forward.  In the 1950s and 
1960s, the period upon which the bulk of historical research has been done hitherto, the 
main protagonists of the integration story were elite decision-makers, able to act in a 
manner which was relatively unencumbered by public opinion.  Prior to 1968 there is 
little evidence of strong popular engagement either for or against European unity.  From 
the 1970s onwards, however, the appearance of public referendums on European topics, 
the entry into the Community of a number of countries with a strong current of 
Euroscepticism, and the beginning of direct elections to the European Parliament, all 
mean that historians will be obliged to address public sentiment about European 
integration to much greater degree than before.  Research into such topics from the 1970s 
onwards is likely to be further facilitated by the greater availability of opinion poll data.  
The rediscovery of pro and anti-European ideas as legitimate subjects for historical 
research and the renewed attention given to the role of political parties in mobilising for 
and against European integration, both noted above, are also likely to encourage 
movement in the same direction.  But even in such favourable circumstances, a conscious 
effort will need to be made to flank the current top-down emphasis of most historical 
research, with a greater degree of investigation into popular attitudes towards Europe and 
the views and opinions of those groups directly affected by the integration process but 
largely uninvolved in shaping its course.  Farmers, fishermen, steel workers, scientists 
receiving EUREKA and other funding from the early 1980s onwards, the first generation 
of ERASMUS students, as well as those European business leaders pressing for a truly 
uniform European market prior to 1985, would all be worthy subjects of detailed studies 
into how European policy was received rather than conceived.  
 Another valuable area of future enquiry would be the way in which the European 
institutions functioned.  It has already become clear from research into the 1960s, that 
patterns of behaviour in Brussels fairly quickly diverged from the expectations of those 
who had initiated the integration process.   Equally clearly this was not simply – or even 
mainly – due to de Gaulle.  But we still know much too little about how the early 
institutions interacted with one another, about who populated Community Brussels, about 
the interchange between the European level of governance and the national, and about the 
way in which the second generation of Community policies – early monetary initiatives, 
the initial stirrings of regional policy etc – were affected by the successes and 
shortcomings of the first.  Did the Community back away from the type of automatic 
spending commitments involved in the CAP, as farm expenditure mushroomed out of 
control in the 1970s and 1980s?  What was the impact upon the workings of the whole 
institutional system of the European Council’s creation in 1974?  How did the arrival of 
cohorts of British, Danish and Irish Eurocrats alter the way Brussels operated?  Or was 
the pioneer spirit already ebbing away sometime before the newcomers took up their new 
posts in the enlarged Community?  These and many other questions need to be 
investigated by the next generation of historians to pore over the records of the Brussels 
institutions and the multiple national ministries involved in playing the European game. 
 Even more fundamentally, however, some of those interested in European 
integration history need to start debating the overall importance and impact of the 
integration process in a way which might capture the interest both of other historians and 
of political scientists, lawyers and economists.  At one level this is likely to involve 
beginning to answer the currently unaddressed questions about how much European 
integration has contributed to Europe’s overall development since World War II.  Has it 
really been the key factor in maintaining peace in what had been a highly volatile 
continent?  Or did this have much more to do with NATO, the American military 
presence and the over-arching cold war framework?  How much, if at all, has economic 
integration shaped the continent’s economic fortunes in the course of the fifty plus years 
since 1958?  How has institutionalised cooperation in Brussels affected the course of 
party politics within each member state, the range of policy options available to national 
leaders, and the trends of public opinion across Europe?  Has European integration 
contributed to those elements of social convergence across Europe identified by social 
historians like Hartmut Kaeble (Kaeble, 2007)?  Or was such convergence instead a 
precondition without which integration could not have worked?  And if the impact of 
European integration on the course of national politics has only been gradual and has 
become of major significance only in its latter stages, when and why did a process which 
began so long ago begin to have an important effect upon national politics?  Beginning to 
answer such queries, would turn integration history into a field which other historians of 
Europe since 1945 could not afford to ignore, even if they were intent upon suggesting a 
rather different assessment of its overall importance. 
 Likewise integration history ought to become a little more self-assertive in its 
interaction with other aspects of European studies, broadly defined.  To a limited extent 
this may involve borrowing or importing concepts and vocabulary developed by political 
scientists, sociologists, economists or legal experts who also work on the EU.  More 
crucial, however, is a readiness to point out when historical research suggests that ideas 
developed to interpret the current integration process do not fit with its past and may 
hence be debatable analyses of its present.  Integration historians do need to read a bit 
more of what other European specialists write  - not primarily so that they can parrot the 
rival terminology, but instead so that they can deploy their expertise in order to challenge 
some of the rival fields’ assumptions. Such challenges may well of course be contested.  
But at very least contestation should lead to a rather more intensive and extensive 
dialogue across disciplinary boundaries than tends to occur at present.  And dialogue 
between different approaches is likely to become even more feasible were some 
historians at least to swallow their qualms about writing about periods of history rather 
more recent than three decades ago. 
 
Conclusion 
 Overall then, integration history, while not without achievements, has a great deal 
still to discover.  It has already put forward quite an extensive set of competing, but 
ultimately complementary, explanations as to why the process got underway.  It has also 
gone a long way in adding both complexity and depth to the rather simplistic account of 
the Community’s early decades of operation promulgated by the memoirs and public 
pronouncements of those who took part.  In addition it has devised both the structures and 
the patterns of behaviour to ensure a lively ongoing debate about the details the 
integration process in the 1960s, increasingly the 1970s, and before too long the 1980s.  
But its most urgent challenge is to break out of its largely self-imposed isolation and 
establish channels of communication both with the wider community of historians 
working on the making of the contemporary world and with the multiple other specialists 
from other academic disciplines who take part in the never-ending attempt to de-mystify 
and explain the EU.  No individual of fifty plus could be sensibly analysed or assessed 
without extensive reference to his or her past; likewise, no political system which has 
been in constant evolution for over five decades can seriously be dissected and 
understood without a much greater contribution from those who specialise in 
understanding its past. 
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